

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: NPT REVCON: COMMITTEE I, TEXT OF US STATEMENT ON SALT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF US (KLEIN) STATEMENT CONCERNING
SALT AGREEMENT AS MADE ON OPENING DAY OF NPT REVCON
COMMITTEE I. FULL REPORT OF COMMITTEE I ACTIVITIES
CONTAINED SEPTTEL.

QUOTE

ARTICLE VI
CONTROL OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS

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SINCE THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE NPT IN 1970, THE UNITED

STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN AN INTENSIVE SERIES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS. THEY HAVE, IN THAT FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, CONCLUDED THREE MAJOR AGREEMENTS TO LIMIT OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC ARMS. THEY ARE NOW WORKING OUT THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF A FOURTH, AND MORE COMPREHENSIVE, AGREEMENT. NONETHELESS, A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS AT THIS CONFERENCE HAVE QUESTIONED WHETHER THE TWO PARTIES TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE, IN THE AREA OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS, FULFILLED THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE VI OF THE NPT TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH ON EFFECTIVE MEASURES REGARDING THE CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT.

MR. CHAIRMAN, IN ORDER TO GAIN AN ACCURATE UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS, I BELIEVE IT IS USEFUL TO RECALL THE SITUATION PREVAILING BEFORE THE ADVENT OF SALT AND THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE NPT. THE PRE-SALT PERIOD WAS A TIME OF CONSIDERABLE STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY. BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD THE CAPACITY TO EMBARK ON A VIRTUALLY LIMITLESS COMPETITION IN STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS. THERE WERE NO INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONSTRAINTS TO PLACE BOUNDARIES ON THE COMPETITION IN STRATEGIC ARMS DEPLOYMENT. NOR WAS THERE ANY MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE ON STRATEGIC MATTERS THAT MIGHT HAVE GIVEN EACH SIDE A BETTER APPRECIATION OF THE OTHER'S APPROACH TO STRATEGIC FORCE PLANNING. AS A RESULT OF THESE UNCERTAINTIES, THE POTENTIAL WAS CLEARLY THERE FOR AN OPEN-ENDED ARMS RACE -- A CONTEST BETWEEN OFFENSE AND DEFENSE, SPIRALING TO HIGHER AND HIGHER LEVELS ON THE BASIS OF PESSIMISTIC PREDICTIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE'S CAPABILITIES.

WE HAVE INDEED COME A LONG WAY FROM THE UNCERTAINTIES AND INHERENT INSTABILITIES OF THE PRE-SALT ERA. THE FIRST MAJOR STEP CAME IN MAY OF 1972 WITH THE SIGNING OF TWO LANDMARK AGREEMENTS, THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS, AND THE FIVE-YEAR INTERIM AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

THESE AGREEMENTS REPRESENTED THE FIRST DIRECT CONTROLS OF AN INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NUCLEAR ERA.
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THEY INCLUDED SIGNIFICANT RESTRAINTS, BOTH QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE, ON OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS.

ON THE QUANTITATIVE SIDE, THE ABM TREATY LIMITED EACH PARTY TO TWO WIDELY-SEPARATED ABM DEPLOYMENT AREAS, EACH CONTAINING NO MORE THAN ONE-HUNDRED ABM LAUNCHERS AND ONE-HUNDRED ABM MISSILES, AND LIMITED NUMBERS OF ABM RADARS OF CERTAIN TYPES. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE ABM TREATY ACTUALLY

RESULTED IN THE DISMANTLEMENT OF ABM COMPONENTS ALREADY UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES. ABM DEPLOYMENTS, AS DR. IKLE NOTED IN HIS ADDRESS, WERE FURTHER LIMITED BY THE 1974 PROTOCOL TO THE ABM TREATY TO A SINGLE DEPLOYMENT AREA FOR EACH SIDE. THE INTERIM AGREEMENT PROHIBITED THE CONSTRUCTION OF ADDITIONAL FIXED LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, AND LIMITED THE NUMBER OF MODERN BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES AND SLBM LAUNCHERS TO THE NUMBER THEN OPERATIONAL OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION, PLUS AN ADDITIONAL NUMBER WHICH MIGHT BE DEPLOYED AS REPLACEMENTS FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS OF CERTAIN OLDER TYPES.

THESE AGREEMENTS CONTAINED IMPORTANT QUALITATIVE AND I REPEAT QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AS WELL. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ABM TREATY STRICTLY LIMITS THE TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ABM RADARS; PROHIBITS GIVING OTHER TYPES OF MISSILES, LAUNCHERS OR RADARS THE CAPABILITY TO COUNTER STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THEIR ELEMENTS IN FLIGHT TRAJECTORY; AND PROHIBITS THE DEVELOPMENT OF RAPID-RELOAD ABM LAUNCHERS, OR OF ABM SYSTEMS WHICH ARE

SEA-BASED, AIR-BASED, SPACE-BASED OR MOBILE LAND-BASED. SIMILARLY, LIMITATIONS WERE PLACED ON INCREASES IN THE DIMENSIONS OF ICBM SILO LAUNCHERS, AND THE CONVERSION OF LAUNCHERS FOR LIGHT ICBMS TO LAUNCHERS FOR MODERN HEAVY ICBMS WAS PROHIBITED.

TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THESE QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ACCOMPLISHED TWO IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES: THEY ELIMINATED THE POSSIBILITY OF NATIONWIDE ABM DEFENSES, WHICH COULD IN TURN HAVE DESTABILIZED THE STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES AND LED TO SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS; AND THEY ESSENTIALLY FROZE, FOR A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, THE OVERALL NUMBER OF OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS.

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TAKING THE SALT I AGREEMENTS AS A STARTING POINT, THE TWO SIDES RESUMED THEIR INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTING IN NOVEMBER 1974 IN THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD BETWEEN PRESIDENT FORD AND CHAIRMAN BREZHNEV. THIS ACCORD ESTABLISHED BOARD GUIDELINES FOR FURTHER DETAILED NEGOTIATION OF A NEW AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THAT WOULD REPLACE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND REMAIN IN FORCE THROUGH 1985. SPECIFICALLY, THE NEW AGREEMENT WILL, FOR THE FIRST TIME, PLACE A COMPREHENSIVE CEILING ON THE TOTAL NUMBER OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES, SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND HEAVY BOMBERS AS WELL AS ON THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS FOR MISSILES THAT COULD BE ARMED WITH MIRVS. THUS, IT WILL IMPOSE EQUAL AGGREGATE TOTALS ON THE STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES OF EACH SIDE, THEREBY LEADING TO A MORE STABLE AND EQUITABLE BALANCE BETWEEN THEM. FINALLY, IT WILL AT LAST PROVIDE US WITH A FIRM BASIS FOR FURTHER

NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE REDUCTIONS IN THE LEVEL OF STRATEGIC ARMS.

MR. CHAIRMAN, VARIOUS DELEGATIONS HAVE CRITICIZED THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS AS BEING AN INADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED UNDER ARTICLE VI OF THE NPT. THEY HAVE CHARACTERIZED THE SALT I AGREEMENTS AND THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD AS RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT LIMITATIONS WHICH DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF COMMITMENT BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL MEASURES.

IN VIEW OF MY DELEGATION, THESE CRITICISMS GREATLY UNDERESTIMATE THE VALUE OF THE SALT AGREEMENTS, AND THE IMMENSE EFFORT, RESOURCES AND POLITICAL COMMITMENT WHICH BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE INVESTED IN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS. EACH COUNTRY HAS CHOSEN TO FOREGO SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENTS WHICH IT CERTAINLY COULD HAVE CARRIED OUT, AND TO RESTRAIN IN IMPORTANT RESPECTS THE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS THAT ARE CENTRAL TO ITS NATIONAL SECURITY. SALT HAS BECOME A PRIMARY ELEMENT IN THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES CONCERNED, AND LEADERS AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO THE SUCCESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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SOME DELEGATIONS HAVE SPOKEN AS IF THE PARTIES TO THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS NEED CONSTANT COAXING AND REMINDING IN ORDER TO KEEP THEM ON THE PROPER COURSE. WHAT IS OVERLOOKED IN SUCH STATEMENTS IS THE FACT THAT CONTINUED PROGRESS IN THE EFFORT TO CONTROL AND REVERSE THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, AND THEREBY TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR, IS VERY MUCH IN THE NATIONAL SELF-INTEREST OF THE TWO PARTICIPANTS. AND IF THAT WERE NOT SUFFICIENT INCENTIVE TO PURSUE THEIR NEGOTIATIONS DILIGENTLY, THE TWO POWERS RECOGNIZE THAT THE LONG-TERM SUCCESS OF NON-PROLIFERATION -- AN OBJECTIVE IN WHICH BOTH PARTIES ALONG WITH ALL PARTIES TO THE NPT AGREEMENT HAVE A MAJOR STAKE -- DEPENDS TO A VERY UNCLASSIFIED

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IMPORTANT DEGREE ON THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE VI. I HOPE IT IS POSSIBLE TO DISPEL ANY DOUBT THAT MAY EXIST AT THIS CONFERENCE ABOUT MY GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION AND COMMITMENT TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS AT SALT.

IN THE COURSE OF OUR DELIBERATIONS, WE HAVE ALSO HEARD A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS EXPRESS CONCERN THAT, TO DATE, THE ACHIEVEMENTS AT SALT HAVE BEEN CONFINED LARGELY TO LIMITATIONS, AS OPPOSED TO REDUCTIONS, IN STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS. THIS IS TRUE. HOWEVER, WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE GOAL MUST BE TO ACHIEVE GREATER SECURITY AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMS, WE SHOULD NOT FAIL TO GRASP THE MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LIMITATIONS THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN IMPOSED.

BY RULING OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF NATION-WIDE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE, THE TWO ABM TREATIES VIRTUALLY ELIMINATE THE INCENTIVE TO BUILD UP OFFENSIVE FORCES AS A HEDGE AGAINST AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF DEFENSE. THUS, THE ABM AGREEMENTS WERE AN IMPORTANT, PERHAPS EVEN NECESSARY, STEP TOWARD THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD ON OFFENSIVE ARMS.

THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT ITSELF CONSTITUTES A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH. IT ENSURES THAT FORCE PLANNING DECISIONS NEED NO LONGER BE DRIVEN BY UNDERTAINTY ABOUT THE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS THE OTHER SIDE CAN DEPLOY, BUT CAN

INSTEAD BE BASED WITH CONFIDENCE ON THE CEILINGS ESTABLISHED.
A CRITICAL LINK IN THE PERNICIOUS CHAIN OF ACTION AND REACTION
HAS THUS BEEN BROKEN.

NOW, MR. CHAIRMAN, THE AGREEMENT ENVISIONED BY THE
VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD IS BY NO MEANS THE LAST STEP IN THIS
PROCESS. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION MUST, OF
COURSE, SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS IMPLEMENTING
THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD BEFORE GOING ON TO FURTHER MEASURES.
HOWEVER, THE UNITED STATES LOOKS FORWARD TO THE COMMENCEMENT
OF FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOLLOWING THE
CONCLUSION OF THE SALT II AGREEMENT, ON FURTHER LIMITATIONS
AND REDUCTIONS IN THE LEVEL OF STRATEGIC ARMS. IN THIS
RESPECT, WE ARE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH THOSE DELE-
GATIONS WHICH HAVE URGED THAT THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD BE
APPROACHED NOT AS A FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE LEVELS OF
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STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS ON BOTH SIDES, BUT RATHER AS THE BASIS
FOR FURTHER AND TIMELY NEGOTIATED REDUCTIONS OF THESE
LEVELS. AS SECRETARY KISSINGER TOLD THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
LAST FALL: "THE UNITED STATES HAS NO HIGHER PRIORITY THAN
CONTROLLING AND REDUCING THE LEVELS OF NUCLEAR ARMS."

HOWEVER, WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE IMPOSITION OF ARTIFICIAL
DEADLINES OR UNREALISTIC MATHEMATICAL FORMULAS ON THIS CRITICAL
PROCESS. THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS ARE A SERIOUS ENDEAVOR,
TOUCHING ON THE MOST VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES
AND THEIR ALLIES, AND REQUIRING AN EXTREMELY CAREFUL WEIGHING
OF THE ALTERNATIVES AT EACH STEP. THEY ARE AT THE SAME TIME
EXTREMELY COMPLICATED, SINCE THEY OFTEN INVOLVE DISSIMILAR
WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES. GREAT CARE MUST
BE TAKEN IN THE DEFINITION OF THE SYSTEMS TO BE COVERED,
IN THE FORMULATION OF THE PRECISE TECHNICAL LIMITATIONS
TO BE IMPOSED, AND IN THE ELABORATION OF PROCEDURES FOR
VERIFYING THAT THESE LIMITATIONS WILL BE COMPLIED WITH.

FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS WILL NOT INVOLVE
AN EXERCISE IN SIMPLE ARITHMETIC, BUT RATHER WILL REQUIRE A
CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF THE LIKELY IMPLICATIONS OF VARIOUS
POSSIBLE REDUCED LEVELS OF STRATEGIC FORCES. THE PACE OF
THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THEREFORE, CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED HERE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, WE BELIEVE THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS IN PURSUIT OF
EFFECTIVE AGREEMENTS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC
ARMAMENTS HAVE BEEN FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE REQUIREMENTS
OF ARTICLE VI. HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT CONTENT TO REST ON
OUR OARS. WE WILL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO ATTEMPT TO HALT AND
REVERSE THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. UNQUOTE. DALE

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